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MISTAKE AND THE CONTRACTUAL INTERESTS
HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK*

T IS reasonable to assume that the theory which the law adopts
as the basis for imposing on the parties to a contract a legal
obligation to perform the contract will have an important influence in the determination of the extent to which those obligations
will be enforced where the contract has been entered into the influence of a mistake by one or both parties. Professor Williston
states' as the first cause he discusses for the confusion in the
cases dealing with mistake in contracts the confusion concerning
the elements of the contract and points out that in some cases,
at least, mistake would have the effect of preventing the formation
of a contract if the legal obligation is based on the theory that the
law is giving effect to the mutual assent of the parties to the terms
of the contract sued upon, but will not affect the enforceability
of the promise if the obligation is imposed because of an exchange of expressions which indicate a mutual assent. If the law
is giving effect to the will of. the parties to the agreement, logic
would induce the adoption of a rule that in any case where the
enforcement of the promise of a party to the contract would not
accord with his will in the situation, because he made the promise
under the influence of a mistake, the promise should not be enforced. On the other hand it would seem that where the law
imposes the obligation because the party has performed a designated act which the law says will bind him to the performance of
the contract, the fact that he is laboring under a mistake at the

time he performs the act should have very little, if any, bearing
upon the extent of his legal obligation.
Under any theory, the law must recognize that some kinds
of mistake prevent the enforcement of the contract. The clearest

example is where there is an ambiguity in the terms used, either
in themselves, or in their application to the particular circumstances, and the parties understand them differently 2 In such a
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
13 Williston on Contracts, (1920) Secs. 1535, 1536.
2The "Peerless Ship Case" Raffles v. Wichelhaus (1864) 2 H. & C.
906, 159 Eng. Repr. 375, Williston, Sales of Goods (1909) p. 5. Even under
the formal Roman contract by stipulatio a mistake of this character prevented the formation of a contract. Radin, Roman Law, (1927) Sec. 58.
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case there is no way by which the law can logically or practically
decide what the contract was and, therefore, it cannot determine
what obligation to impose on either party.
Where the obligation of the contract is based, not on the will
of the parties, nor on some purely formal act, such as the affixing
of a seal to a document, but upon the exchange of expressions by
the parties which indicate that the minds have met on the terms of
the contract, which, according to Professor Williston,3 and the
Restatement of Contracts, 4 is the case with our legal system, the
effect of a mistake may be expected to be less of a bar to the
enforcement of the contract than where the obligation is based
on the will of the parties, but it has been given the effect of preventing the enforcement of the contract in many cases not coming within the group where it prevents the law from determining
what the terms of the contract were. The law has made a distinction between the latter type of mistake, which prevents the
formation of any contract, and other types, which merely make
the contract which was formed by the exchange of expressions of
assent subject to avoidance by one of the parties, or lead to the
modification of the expressed terms. The uniform holding of our
courts, both of law and equity, that where the mistake is mutual
with respect to the substance of the contract, or where it is unilateral, but caused by the innocent act of the other party, or one
of which at the time the other party to the contract was aware,
or reasonably should have been aware, the contract is voidable
may be reconciled with the theory of meeting of objective expressions, since here the law does not deny that the expressions created
the contract, but merely provides a means by which the obligation may be avoided under certain circumstances. 5 But a court
influenced by that theory of contracts would be apt to be more
strict in the application of these rules to specific cases, and we
might, therefore, expect that relief against contracts for mistake
could be obtained less easily now than formerly when the courts
professed to be enforcing the will of the parties-in giving binding
effect to a- contract. We are not here dealing with precise rules
whose ongm can be traced to a specific case, as was the case with
the rules governing the necessity for communication of an accepsWilliston, Mutual Assent in the Formation of Contracts, (1919) 14
Ill. L. Rev. 85, Selected Readings on the Law of Contracts, 119.
4American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Contracts, (1932)
Secs. 20, 21.
53 Williston on Contracts, (1920) Sec. 1579.
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tance, or of a revocation, of an offer, 6 and we cannot with reference to the inconsistencies in the law of mistake assert either that
they are due, or are not due, to the theory of contract prevailing
when the rule was established. But a general survey of the mistake
cases does not indicate that the theory of expressed assents has
had any influence in lessening the liberality with which relief for
mistake has been given. The cases in which it was held that the
presence of the gravel, which was actually on the land sold, as
assumed by the parties, in such accumulations as to permit it to
be commercially excavated, went to the subject matter of the contract, and not merely to its characteristcs, 7 and the one most
frequently criticized for allowing relief for a purely unilateral mistake, not caused by or known to the other party," were both decided after it had become settled in other cases that a man was
bound by the expression of his assent, regardless of his subjective
will. 9
Since the parol evidence rule is one of the strongest arguments
for the doctrine that the obligation of a contract is based on the
exchange of expressions of assent, not on the subjective meeting
of the minds,1" the remedy of reformation of contractual instruments to make them conform to the actual intent of the parties,
which necessarily rejects the rule, is difficult to reconcile with the
doctrine, especially where there has been no previous exchange of
expressions to which the instrument may be made to conform, but
only a general understanding between the parties. The explanation
that in these cases the court of equity "subjects one who has made
no legal contract or conveyance, to the same obligations as if he
had,"'1 was difficult to maintain- when law and equity were administered as separate systems of remedies, and becomes impossible when they are fused in one system and when now in an
6Williston, Mutual Assent in the Formation of Contracts, (1919) 14 I11.
L. Rev., 85, 87, Selected Readings on the Law of Contracts 119, 121.
7
Edwards v. Trinity & B. V R. Co., (1909) 54 Tex. Civ. App. 334, 118
S. W 572.
sSt. Nicholas Church v. Kropp, (1916) 135 Minn. 115, 116 N. W 500,
L. R. A. 1917D 741.
9
Williston, Mutual Assent in the Formation of Contracts, (1919) 14
Ill. L. Rev. 85, 87, Selected Readings on the Law of Contracts 119, 121,
dates this doctrine from the second half of the Nineteenth Century. He cites
as clear judicial expressions of it Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, (1911)
200 Fed. 287, 293, and O'Donnell v. Clinton, (1888) 145 Mass. 461, 463, 14
N. E. 747
loWilliston, Mutual Assent in the Formation of Contracts, (1919) 14
Ill. L. Rev. 85, 89, Selected Readings on the Law of Contracts, 119, 122.
113 Williston on Contracts, (1920) Sec. 1537
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action for damages for breach of contract, defendant can plead
as a defense that the instrument sued on does not correctly embody
the agreement of the contract, and prevail if the court finds the
12
facts accordingly.
It is quite evident that if we are to explain the confusion in the
cases dealing with mistake, and discover some principle which
will bring more harmony in this field of the law, we must seek
some explanation other than the doctrinal theories as to the basis
for the legal obligation of parties to ,a contract.
In recent years jurists have not been content with explanations of law in the form of doctrines deduced by generalizations
from the cases with the rejection, as "bad law" of those cases
which do not fit the doctrine, but have sought rather to ascertain
the social policy or purpose underlying the particular doctrines and
to determine the factors that led the courts to refrain from applying an apparently applicable doctrine to the particular case before
it. According to the, jurisprudence developed by Dean Pound,"
the court in any case where it has to develop a new doctrine of
law, or adapt an old doctrine to a new set of circumstances, seeks
to assign to the interests asserted by the respective parties a social
value or weight, and then to balance these social values or interests
against each other and to develop a doctrine which will preserve
the greatest possible weight of social interests. Under this formula,
the doctrine of the will theory of contracts accords with our
sQcial policy of free enterprise and, therefore, is adopted by the
courts. But in those cases where the expression of one of the
parties does not accord with his unexpressed intent, this social
interest comes in conflict -with the social interest in the "security
of transactions" which is also an interest of very great importance
in a social system based on a credit economy which can operate
only if men can rely with reasonable certainty on the expressed
commitments of other men; particularly when they are expressed in
a written document. In these cases the courts have held that the
social policy which protects an individual against the imposition
of a contractual obligation which does not accord with his will,
must yield to the general social policy that men must be able to
rely on the promises made by others when the other factors to
Susquehanna S. S. Co. v. 0. A. Andersen & Co., (1995) 239 N. Y.
285, 146 N. E. 381, Hinton, Equitable Defenses Under Modern Codes,

(1920) 18 Mich. L. Rev. 717
1sA brief summary by Dean Pound of his juristic philosophy of balanc-

ing the interests is set fofth in Pound, Interests of Personality, (1915)
28 Harv. L. Rev. 343-346.
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make such promises binding are present.14 But the formula does
not require, or even suggest, that the doctrine so adopted will
have to be applied in every situation,l' but rather that it may be
modified so as not to apply in those occasional cases where this
particular interest is outweighed by the interests which would
have to be sacrificed if the expressed agreement were to be enforced. Perhaps an examination of the social interests involved
in the mistake cases, where rescission", of a voidable contract or
reformation of the terms of an agreement is sought may be of
some assistance in clearing up the confusion in the law with regard
to these cases.
The interests of parties to a contract have been exhaustively
analyzed with respect to the rights of such parties to recover
damages or restitution upon the non-performance by the other
party"' The claim to have the contract performed according to its
terms is designated as. the expectation interest and, where it is
recognized by the law as valid, is protected by an action at law
for damages measured by the value of the lost performance, or
' 4 Even Jerome Frank who bases his book Law and the Modern Mind,
(1930) largely on the hypothesis that the "myth" of certainty in the law is
the result of the persistence of the father-complex of childhood into adult
years, concedes in a footnote on p. 11 that the demand for a predictable law
in part arises from practical needs but considers that the practical aspect
of it has been exaggerated. A lawyer who is assisting in the negotiation of
a war contract on the baasis of which his client will have to contract for
supplies and conduct his entire business in the future, or one who is advising as to a merger of businesses which may violate the anti-trust laws,
discovers that the practical aspects of his client's deniand that lie be informed
as to the legal effect of the contemplated transactions can scarcely be exaggerated.
15"Another point in the program of sociological jurists is the importance of reasonable and just solutions of individual causes, too often
sacrificed in the immediate past to the attempt to bring about an impossible
degree of certainty. * * * they conceive of the legal rule as a general
guide to the judge, leading him toward the just result, but insist that within
wide limits he should be free to deal with the individual case, so as to meet
the demands of justice between the parties and accord with the general
reason of ordinary men." Pound, Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, (1912) 25 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 515.
' 0 The text of the Restatement of Contracts uses the term "avoidance"
for the act of terminating a voidable contract by the act of the party, reserving the term "rescission" for termination by agreement of the parties.
Secs. 406-409. But the courts almost always use the term "rescission" to
cover both methods of termination, the Contracts Restatement is not consistent, for its index includes all of the sections dealing with termination
of voidable contracts under the heading "Rescission," limiting the heading
of "Avoidance" merely to cross references, and the American Law Institute's Restatement of Restitution, (1937) also designates the termination of
a voidable contract by the act of the party as "rescission." The more usual
term of rescission is, therefore, used in this article.
"7Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages,
(1936, 1937) 46 Yale L. Journ. 52, 373.
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by a sut in equity for specific performanice of the contract if the
recovery of damages is not an adequate remedy for the nonperformance. In those cases where the law does not give protection to this expectation interest, either party may assert a restitution interest by seeking to recover what he has paid or delivered
to the other party under the contract, or a reliance interest by seeking to recover for other losses which he may have sustained because of his action under the agreement with the expectation that
it would be enforced. What is attempted here is an application of
the analysis of Fuller and Perdue to the avoidance and reformation
cases.
The Contracts Restatement condenses its provisions with respect to mistake in entering into contracts into one chapter of only
twelve sections."8 It permits the avoidance of contracts by the
party injured by the mistake in cases where the mistake is mutual
and relates-to a "fact assumed by them as the basis on which they
entered into the transaction," unless the party seeking avoidance
can obtain reformation, or performance according to the actual
intent of the parties, or he may receive compensation which will
put him in as good a position as if the contracthad been what
he supposed it to be.1 9 If the mistake is that of only one of the
parties, the contract is not thereby made voidable unless the mistake was induced by the misrepresentation of the other party, or
was known to him to exist when he entered into the contract.20
These rules can unquestionably be sustained by the decisions of
most of the courts which-have dealt with the problem of rescission
for mistake, but they are of little aid in dissolving the confusion
oLthe law on the subject unless we say that the multitudinous
cases which have qualified them, or made exceptions to them, are
all bad-law.
Where the mistake is mutual and its effect is to make the contract something, substantially different from that intended by the
parties, there is no difference of opinion in the cases, all agree
that the contract is voidable. In that situation neither party has
a valid expectation interest in the contract as actually made, since
neither intended it to have that effect, and the interest of one
party to gain an unexpected advantage at the expense of the other
because of their common mistake is one that the law clearly ought
not to recognize. But difficulty arises when the mistake does not
'SAmerican Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Contracts, (1932)
Chapter
17, Secs. 500-511.
'29 Sec. 502.
oSec. 503 and comment (a) referring to sees. 476, 472 (b).
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completely alter the intended effect of the contract. As the deviation of the effect of the contract under the facts as they acually
exist from that which was intended by the parties becomes less,
the claim of the expectation interest to legal recognition and protection becomes stronger until the situation is reached where the
effect of the mistake is only trivial and it may be assumed that
the privilege of avoiding the contract on account of it is claimed
as a means of escaping from the obligations of the contract because
for some other reason it has become burdensome rather than advantageous. It has been the attempt of the courts to fix the line
at which the mistake ceased to be of sufficient importance to outweigh the expectation interest of the party who still seeks the enforcement of the contract, by the formulation of some rule that
would accomplish the result automatically that has caused most
of the confusion in the law with respect to mutual mistake. One
attempt to formulate such a rule was made by the cases which
held that the mistake did not make the contract voidable where it
did not relate to the essence of the subject matter of the contract
but only to its characteristics. 21 This rule certainly gives protection against rescission of the contract for merely trivial mistakes,
and so gives ample protection to the expectation interest, but in
many cases it was felt that it went too far in that direction and
the courts therefore began to allow rescission in many cases where
the mi.stake was clearly only as to the characteristics by the bare
assertion that those characteristics were of the essence of the contract.2 2 As a result the rule has become one of little value as a

means of determining where the line between valid and voidable
contracts will be drawn. Another method by which the courts
have limited the cases of rescission for mutual mistake has been
2
Hecht v. Batcheller, (1888) 147 Mass. 335, 17 N. E. 651, 9 Am. St.
Rep. 708, Costello v. Sykes, (1919) 143 Minn. 109, 172 N. W 907, 5 A. L. R.
250; Richardson v. Chicago, M. & St. P R. Co., (1924) 157 Minn. 474, 196
N. W 643, 2 Por. Eq. Jur. (4th ed., 1918) Sec. 856 and cases cited in note
1, therein.
2
-Hannah v. Steinman, (1911) 159 Cal. 142, 112 Pac. 1094, (ignorance
of zoning ordinance that prevented erection of intended building on property involved) , Baker v. Fitzgerald, (1903) 204 Ill. 325, 68 N. E. 430
(walls of building involved too weak to permit erection of intended additional stories) , Sherwood v. Walker, (1887) 66 Mich. 568, 33 N. W 919,
11 Am. St. Rep. 531 (contract to sell thoroughbred cow for her value as
beef, thinking she was barren, when in fact she was fertile and worth at
least ten times that amount) , Edwards v. Trinity & B. V R. Co., (1909)
54 Tex. Civ. App. 334, 118 S. W 572 (mistaken belief that gravel on land
sold for gravel pit was in bodies large enough for excavation by a power
shovel) , Bedell v. Wilder, (1893) 65 Vt. 406, 26 Atd. 589, 36 Am. St. Rep.
871 (ignorance of restrictions on the use of water power which prevented
the use the buyer intended).
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by the doctrine that the mistake must be as to a matter of fact,
not as to a matter of law.2- Again the rule was found to give too
much protection to the expectation interest at the expense of the
party injured by the mistake, and again the rule was substantially
destroyed by qualifications and restnctions, 2 4 principally by the
restriction that a mixed mistake of law-and fact would be treated
as a mistake of fact, and that all mistakes as to the legal rights of
the parties were of that character. - 5 It is true, of course, that any
legal right depends on the application to the facts involved of
some doctrine of law, and may, therefore, be considered a mixed
question of-law and fact, but in many of the cases, if not in most
of them, where this qualification was applied, it was clear that
the mstake did not relate to the facts but only to the application
to the facts of a mistakenly assumed rule of law. Some modem
cases have rejected the rule altogether and give relief for a mistake of law as freely as for a mistake of fact.20
The Contracts Restatement gives little, aid in the solution of
the problems here under consideration. It states that the mistakes
made by the parties must be as to a "fact assumed by them as the
basis on which they entered into the transaction." 2- The comment
to this section rejects the rule that the mistake must relate to the
essence, "identity" of the subject matter of the contract, and apparently makes the test of whether the fact as to wluch the mistake related a subjective one by the statement that: "The
2

3Hemphill v. Moody, (1879) 64 Ala. 468, Fowler v. Black, (1891)
136 Ill. 363, 26 N. E. 596, 11 L. R. A. 670; Stafford v. Fetters, (1881) 55
Ia. 484, 8 N. W 322; Jordan v. Stevens, (1863) 51 Me. 78, 81 Am. Dec.
556; Bowen v. Pursel, (1931) 109 N. J. Eq. 67, 156 At. 649. Very frequently the courts give as the reason for this rule. the policy of the law
against permitting a party to plead ignorance of the la%%,
but whatever the
reason for its adoption, the effect of its application has been to protect an
interest in the performance of the contract which is not justified because it
is not what was intended by either party -when the contract was entered
into. 24
Even in the case of Jordan v. Stevens, (1863) 51 Me. 78, 81 Am. Dec.
556, where the court said: "It is impossible to uphold tie government, and
so to maintain its administration as to protect public and private rights,
except upon the principle that the rights and liabilities of everyone shall be
the same as if he knew the law," the decision was to give relief against the
enforcement of the contract because of tliemtstake.
25Lansdowne v. Lansdowne, (1730) Mos. 364, 2 Jac. & W 205, Bingham
v. Bingham, (1748) 1 Ves. Sr. 126, 27 Eng. Repr. 934, In re Swift (U. S.
D. C., Mass., 1901) 111 Fed. 503, Morgan v. Dod, (1877) 3 Colo. 551,
Renard v. Clink, (1892) 91 Mich. 1, 51 N. W 692, 30 Am. St. Rep. 458,
Gerdine
v. Menage, (1889) 41 Minn. 417, 43 N. W 91.
26
Peterson Y. First Nat Bank of Ce lon, (19275) 162 finn. 369, 203
N. W 53, 42 A. L. R. 1185.
-7American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Contracts, (1932)

Sec. 502.
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materiality of the fact is weighty evidence that the parties made
this assumption.1 2 It is very doubtful whether this formulation
of the rule gives sufficient recognition to the legitimate expectation
interest of the party refusing to rescind the contract, tinder some
circumstances. Suppose, for example that V and P have contracted
for the sale of a residence to P During the course of the negotiations, and after the price had been agreed upon, P stated that he
assumed from certain characteristics of the architecture that the
house was designed by the well known architect X. V replied that
he did not build the house and did not know who the architect
was, but that he now was persuaded by P that it was X. Before
the contract was performed, an economic depression reduced the
values of all houses in that community by 50% and P then made
an investigation which disclosed that the house was not designed
by X, and thereupon gave notice that the contract was at an end
because of the mutual mistake. It would seem that V could not
insist upon the performance under these circumstances. Certainly
there could be no reformation or performance by him which would
make the bargain accord with what the parties thought that it was,
nor would the recovery of compensation measured by the increase
in value which the fact that X designed it would give to the house
"put him in as good a position as if the transaction had been what
he supposed it to be ;" 29 for one thing that increase probably could
not be ascertained by any standard, and for another, whatever increase the parties thought that fact would give to the value of the
house was probably not included in the price fixed since that price
had been agreed upon before any consideration was given to the
fact. Both parties knew that the fact was material in the mind
of P, and it was assumed by both as a basis on which the parties
bargained. If it be material under the Restatement rule, it is
probable that not even P himself could say whether he would have
made the contract if he had known the house was not designed
by X. But should the law deny all recognition to V's expectation
interest because of this relatively immaterial mistake, which did
not, so far as the facts show, add anything to the amount which
he was to receive under his contract? If it appears also that because of his having made the contract with P, he lost a chance to
sell the house to another before the collapse in values, he may
assert a reliance interest which ought to receive some recognition
from the law It may be predicted with considerable confidence
28

Comment (a) to Sec. 502.

29

American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Contracts Sec.
502 (c).
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that under these circumstances the court would hold P to a performance of his contract, notwithstanding the apparent authority
of the Restatement to the contrary.
The Restatement states that the mistake must relate to "a
fact."'30 Neither the comment nor the illustrations under this section indicate the meaning of the term "fact" in this connection,
but it may be assumed that it was here used in the same sense
that it is used in the chapter on fraud and misrepresentation,
where it is stated that the word "facts" in that section is given its
broadest meamng, which includes a rule of law.31 With this meaning the Restatement is in harmony with the recent cases which
have rejected the rule that a mutual mistake of fact does not
make the contract voidable.
Where the mistake was unilateral and not induced by the
misrepresentations of the other party, or known to lum under
circumstances which required him to correct it before .making
tl{contract, the law gave recognition to the expectation interest
of the other party by the adoption of the rule that the contract
could not be avoided for a unilateral mistake.3 2 This rule. is still
stated by the courts as a reason for denying rescission, 3 and is
approved by the Restatement" and by writers on the subject5 5
The Explanatory Notes of the Reporter 6 cite more cases in
which rescission was allowed for a unilateral mistake, than those
3ORescission is allowed where the parties are "both under a mistake
regarding a fact assumed by them." American Law Institute, Restatement
of the
Law of Contracts, (1932) Sec. 502.
3
- Sec. 470, Comment (b).
323 Williston on Contracts, (1920) Secs. 1573-1578.
33Steinmeyer v. Schroeppel, (1907) 226 Ill. 9, 80 N. E. 564, 10 L .R. A.
(N.S.) 114, 117 Am. St. Rep. 224, Tatum v. Coast Lumber Co., (1909) 16
Idaho 471, 101 Pac. 957, 23 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1109; John J. Bowes Co. v.
Milton, (1926) 255 Mass. 228, 151 N. E. 116; Wheeler v. Holloway (Tex.
Comm.
App., 1925) 276 S. W 653.
34 American Law Institute Restatement of the Law of Contracts, (1932)
Sec. 503.
353 Wiliston on Contracts, (1920)
Sec. 1573, Lubell, Unilateral
Palpable and Impalpable Mistake in Construction Contracts, (1932) 16
Minn. L. Rev. 137, 142. This article is a study of the variation in bids for
construction contracts to deterrmne the variation that may be expected in
them in the absence of any claim of mistakees, in order to determine what
variation makes the mistake "palpable," that is, one which the other party
should have known to have eoxisted. The conclusion is that the courts
frequently find that the receiver of the bid ought to have known of the
mstake, when the evidence does not sustain that finding. May this not be
a device by-the courts to give relief for a unilateral mistaken when the
injury to the bidder from it is greater than the law ought to require him
to -bear?
. 6American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Tentative Draft No. 9, (1931) p. 226.
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where it was refused, but adopts the rule of the latter group as
more consistent with the objective assent theory of contracts,
and with the policy of stability and definiteness which were the
best reasons for the adoption of the objective theory Where the
mistake is only unilateral, it is unquestionably proper that the
courts should relieve the party making the mistake from his obligation less freely than where the mistake is mutual, because the
other party to the contract gets from the mistake nothing in addition to that for which he bargained. His expectation interest has
a much stronger claim to recognition than that of a party who
will obtain from the performance of the contract an unexpected
advantage.
But the interest in stability of contracts should not outweigh
all other interests. In the Minnesota case 7 which has become a
leading case for the rescission of a contract for a purely unilateral
mistake, the action was brought on a certified check for $1,000
deposited by the lowest bidder for the construction of a church,
whose bid was accepted. Before any action had been taken by the
church trustees in reliance on the acceptance of the bid, the bidder
discovered that in making his bid he had omitted to include the
cost of the structural steel work in the building, an item which he
estimated at $2,350. Defendant's bid was $30,973, which was about
$3,900 below the next higher bid, but a belated bid was accepted
after defendant refused to enter into the contract which was only
about $1,300 higher than defendant's bid, so the church lost
nothing because of defendant's mistake except the opportunity to
have the structure built for less than any builder thought he could
profitably build it. The court in that case accepted the jury's finding, approved by the trial court, that defendant was guilty of no
negligence in making the mistake, a finding which it is hard to
reconcile with the admitted facts as to how it was made, but even
if there were negligence, should the law impose what amounts to
a penalty of $1,000 for negligence which resulted in no injury? If
the recovery is not to be allowed as a penalty for negligence, the
only other basis for sustaining it would be the desirability of
"stability and definiteness," but it is doubtful if many modern
courts would rate this interest so highly in the particular situation.
The interest of certainty is much more important in dealing with
sales contracts and commercial paper, but even with respect to
them, where the interests of no third person are affected and the
37St. Nicholas Church v. Kropp, (1916)
500, L. R. A. 1917D 741.

135 Minn. 115, 160 N. W
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innocent party has suffered no loss by the mistake, that interest
should yield to the manifest injustice of subjecting the defendant
to a heavy penalty for an omission which has injured no one.
Where there is no expectation interest, as where the unilateral
mistake results in the payment of money which is not owing,38
andwhere the expectation interest is not legally protected because
no consideration has been given, as in the case of a gift made under
a unilateral mistake of the donor,39 the law permits relief, which
seems pretty strong indication that its reason for refusal of relief
in the case of a unilateral mistake by a party to a bilateral contract
is based rather on the principle of protecting.that interest than on
the principle of securing stability and certainty in the law.
The Contracts Restatement says that different mistakes of
the parties relating to the same matter permit rescission but that
different mistakes of the parties with respect to different matters
do not.4 0 The comment merely restates the latter proposition without giving any reason for it, and there is no -illustration of what is
considered separate mistakes relating to different matters. It
would be a very unusual situation which would raise such a question in court. If the mistake of each party was such as to make
that party anxious to be relieved of the obligation of the contract, the
contract would be terminated by mutual consent. If either party
chose to abide by the contract, notvithstanding the mistake on his
part, the knowledge of that mistake would probably never reach
the other party or the court and the case would appear to be one
of simple unilateral rmstake. If the question did reach the court,
there is no apparent reason why it should not be treated as a case
of mutual mistake, unless we regard the verbal argument that the
rule for rescission is limited to cases of "mutual" mstake as
enough, and even then it seems just about as difficult to call
separate mistakes a to the same matter "mutual" as to apply the
same designation to separate mistakes as to different matters. In
either event, neither party expected the contract to give him what
it will give him if enforced according to its terms, and neither,
therefore, has a valid expectation interest which the law should
protect by holding the other party to the contractual terms.
The confusion in the cases as to the right to reformation of an
instrument to make it conform to the. actual agreement of the
parties, is very largely due to the tendency to argue from rescission
3s3 Wiliston on Contracts, (1920) Secs. 1574, 1575.

Sec. 1573.
393
40 Williston on Contracts, (1920)
Amenrican Law Institute, Restataement of the Law of Contracts, (1932)
Sec. 503.
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cases to reformation cases, as the courts often have done. The
remedy of reformation by which the expression of the agreement
in a written instrument is made to conform to the actual agreement
between the parties, is so, radically different from the remedy of
rescission by which the obligation of the contract is terminated,
that any attempt to use the latter as analogy for the former is
bound to result in confusion and injustice. A common example
of this confusion is in the discussion of the requirement of
mutuality of the mistake. 41 Where the written instrument fails to
embody the terms agreed to by the parties, there can be no unilateral mistake, unless the other party notices the discrepancy and
seeks to take advantage of it, which is uniformly considered as a
fraud for which reformation may be granted.
The granting of the remedy of reformation never defeats the
expectation interest of either party to the instrument, but makes
it effective to protect that interest. The instrument, as reformed,
expresses the true agreement. The only possible basis for refusal
of relief in cases where the agreement is not correctly expressed in
the instrument is, therefore, to be found in the policy of the law,
for reasons of certainty and stability, to refuse to permit the
language of the instrument to be contradicted by other evidence as
to what the agreement really was, a policy embodied in the parol
evidence rule. Courts of equity have conformed to this rule where
there is no attempt to obtain reformation of the instrument, and,
where reformation is sought, they have sustained the policy so far
as they thought desirable by requiring the mistake to be proved
by clear and convincing evidence. 42 But when the mistake has been
admitted by the pleadings, or has been proved with the required
certainty, they have felt that the policy of protecting the expecta4'See Salomon v. North British & Merc. Ins. Co., (1915) 215 N. Y.
214, 109 N. E. 121, L. R. A. 1917C 106 where reformation of a clause for
payment of loss to plaintiff as mortgagee was refused for the reason that
the mistake was not shared by the insurer, the clause as written expressed
just what it intended the agreement to be. The court overlooked the fact,
which was pointed out in Hemphill v. New York Life Ins. Soc., (1922)
195 Ky. 783, 243 S. W 1040, that in these cases where reformation of such
a clause of the policy is sought, there is no real contract negotiated by the
parties, but the clause is inserted at the request of insured, and as lie desires it, under the rights given him by the contract. In such a case the
transaction should be treated like the reformation of a gift, in which cases
only the mistake of the donor is material. Mitchell v. Mitchell, (1869) 40
Ga. 11, Crockett v. Crockett, (1884) 73 Ga. 647, Ferrell v. Ferrell, (1903)
53 W Va. 515, 44 S. E. 187 In other gift cases reformation is allowed for
the mistake of the donor without considering whether the donor shared in
the mistake, as in Andrews v. Andrews, (1859) 12 Ind. 348.
4American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Contracts, (1932)
Sec. 511.
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tion interests of the parties outweighs the policy of certainty, and
have granted the relief of reformation. The practice of some code
courts- to submit the-issue of mistake to the jury in cases where a
mistake entitling the defendant to reformation is pleaded as an
equitable defense to an action for damages for breach of the contract may endanger this interest of certainty,4 3 because the jury is
not so apt as a court to give proper weight to that general interest
as against the interest of the individual parties to the particular
case, but the preservation of the interest in the certainty of instruments ought not to defeat reformation when there is no doubt
that the instrument fails to incorporate the true agreement of the
parties.
_
The refusal of reformation because of the negligence of the
plaintiff in failing -to read the instrument before lie signed it, is
another instance of application of rescission principles to reformation cases. 44 There may be some question as to whether the law
should'penalize a man for negligent unilateral mistake in entering
into the contract-by requiring him to perform the contract even at
a serious loss, -but there would seem to be no equitable basis for
saying that his negligence bars the.right to reformation when the
other party must have been either equally negligent in failing to
observe that the terms of the instrument varied from those of the
agreement, or else -be seeking to take advantage of that mistake
which he did notice.
There are some situations in which the right to reformation
may not be clear, even though the facts are admitted. One of these
is illustrated by the, well known case in which some of the justices
of the United States Supreme Court stated that reformation could
43
Amencan Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Contracts, (1932)
Sec. 507, and Comment.
4
4 In Reid, Murdoch & Co. v. Bradley, (1898)
105 Ia. 220, 74 N. WV.
896, the court refused reformation of an instrument because of negligence
in failing to read it before signing. The court relied on Glenn & Pryce v.
Statler, (1875) 42 Iowa 107, a rescission case, and McCormack v. Molburg, (1876) 43 Ia. 561 where the mistake -vas set up as a defense to recovery on the instrument. It did not consider whether the other party in
the principal case was equally negligent, or whether lie knew of the terms
of the instrument. The latter was probably the case because lie presented a
form of guaranty of all debts, past and future, to Bradley, and when the
latter refused to guarantee past debts, told him to strike out one clause,
without mentioning other clauses which had the effect of including the past
debts. The result of this case w\as to impose on the guarantor a large liability
which the other ,party knew he had expressly refused to assume, merely
because he negligently failed to read the instrument and did not know that
he should have stricken out other clauses than those pointed out to him, an
outstanding case of injustice resulting from the blind application of general
rules.
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not be granted for a mistake of law 45 In that case the parties had
consulted counsel for advice as to the security of a loan made to
the owner of an interest in a ship. They were advised as to the
relative merits of a bill of sale, and of a power of attorney to sell
the borrower's interest in the ship, and chose the latter to avoid
the necessity of changes in the register of the ship. Before the loan
was repaid, the borrower died, and it was held that the power was
not one coupled with an interest and, therefore, ended with the
death of the creator of the power. The borrower's estate was insolvent and the lender sued for reformation, which was properly
denied because there was no agreement for the execution of the
bill of sale to -which the instrument could be made to conform. In
many cases it may be difficult to determine on similar facts
whether the agreement between the parties was for adequate security, the choice of form to be left to the draftsman of the instrument, in which case reformation might be given, or whether it
was for the specific form drafted.
In those cases where there has been no specific formulation of
the terms of the agreement before the instrument is drafted, there
may be a similar close question as to whether the agreement was
to use the terms embodied in the. instrument, under a mistaken
belief that they had a meaning other than their legal meaning, in
which case the remedy, if any, can only be rescission, or whether
they agreed upon the idea which they mistakenly supposed was
expressed by those terms, in which case reformation can be allowed. 4r The ordinary rule as to the degree of proof required would
45

Hunt v. Rousmaniere's Administrator, (1828) 1 Pet. 1, 7 L. Ed. 27
In this opinion Washington, J. stated that reformation could not be given
for a mistake of law, though in a previous opinion in the same case on
appeal from a ruling on demurrer, (1823) 8 Wheat. 174, 5 L. Ed. 589,
Marshall, C. J., who wrote the opinion of the court, had stated that there
was no rule that a plain and acknowledged mistake of law was beyond the
reach of equity. The statement of Washington, J., has been frequently cited
as establishing the proposition that reformation cannot be given for a
mistake of law. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Contracts, (1932) Sec. 504, does not mention mistake of law, but it does allow
relief wherever the instrument executed by the parties is "materially
at variance with that intention." 3 Williston on Contracts, (1920) Sec.
1585, expressly states that reformation may be allowed for a mistake
of law, and that is now the general rule. For a time Illinois adhered
to the contrary rule, but it expressly rejected it in Darst v. Lang, (1937)
367 Ill.
119, 10 N. E. (2d) 659.
4GIn Pittsburgh Lumber Co. v. Shell, (1916) 136 Tenn. 466, 189 S. W
879, the parties intended to convey to the purchaser all of the vendor's land
in a stream watershed, and employed a surveyor to run the line. He ran
the -line along Sheep Rock Ridge, and the deed was drawn accordingly,
both parties understanding that the boundary of the land conveyed ran along
that ridge, but thinking the ridge was the divide between the watersheds,
whereas in fact it was not. Reformation was properly denied on a finding
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lead to the denial of the relief unless it was clear that the agreement was as to the idea, not as to the terms.
In some of the reformation cases, it seems to be apparent from
the facts, though not considered by the court, that the difficulty
arises from a lack of agreement as-to terms. The parties have
agreed generally as to the object to be attained and have left
to the draftsman, usually an attorney, the task of framing an
instrument which will express this agreement. Very often in such
work, he will be compelled to insert many provisions as to which
the parties reached no agreement because they were never considered, but which provisions are usual in a complete instrument. In these cases, the courts may properly hold that the failure
of a party to read the instrument, or to object to the inclusion of
such a term bars his right to object after the execution of the
instrument. 47 In that situation the other party may have read and
understood the terms of the instrument without being guilty of
.any fraud in accepting it as the embodiment of the agreement,
and, therefore, he has a justifiable expectation interest in the enforcement of the instrument as drafted. In any event reformation
to include a different term on that subject would be clearly
erroneous, and the only alternatives are to enforce the instrument
as drafted, or to permit its cancellation.
This very general and brief survey of the lav of mistake as a
ground for rescission or reformation of a contract, indicates that
the confusion in the cases on these questions is due primarily to the
inadequacy of the rules as formulated to meet the needs of particular cases, and that it cannot be lessened, either by a reassertion
of those rules, or by the formulation of new ones. Much of the
confusion in the cases when they are considered as applications
of the rules of law which they profess to follow, is eliminated
when they are considered as efforts to find a correct balance of the
conflicting interests involved. It is probable that even more of the
confusion would be eliminated if the courts consciously sought
to balance the interests rather than to follow specific rules. But
it is idle to hope that all of it would disappear even then, for
we have as yet no accurate scales for weighing the relative social
values of the several interests advanced by the respective parties
that they intended to convey the land as described, but mistakingly thought
it was all m one w.atershed. A slight variation in facts might have led to
reformation to make the conveyance conform to the understanding with respect to the watershed.
47Isaacs v. Schmuck, (1927) 245 N. Y. 77, 156 N. E. 621, 51 A. L. R.
1454.
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in this, or any other, field of the law It is undoubtedly idle to
hope that any such instrument will ever be devised and we will
have to be content with the best approximation that can be
reached by intelligent judges, advised by intelligent counsel, and
made aware of the precise issues involved. But the fact that we
cannot hope for complete success is no excuse for not undertaking
the task and progressing as far as we can.
Some of the difficulty in balancing the interests will be eliminated if we keep in mind the power of the court to adapt the
remedy to the particular needs of the situation. Very often the
court is not limited to a choice of recognizing the interests of one
party and denying protection -to the interests of the other, but
may, contrive a remedy which will give a large degree of recognition and protection to both. One form of this adaptation of remedy
is recognized in the provision of the Contracts Restatement that
rescission will be denied in cases of mutual mistake if the party
who suffers from the mistake can have reformation of the contract to make it conform to what he intended it to be. 48 It is not
expressly so stated, but probably is intended that this relief can
be given only with the consent of the one who benefited by the
mistake, as the cases generally provide. 49 Surely it cannot be meant
that the court can substitute for the agreement actually made by
the parties one which it assumes or finds they would have made
if they had not made the mutual mistake. The effect of such a rule
would be to eliminate the distinction between the kind of mistake
that permits reformation, and that which permits only rescission
in all cases where such a change in the terms of the contract
could be made. Even more clearly, there is no basis on which to
sustain the imposition on the benefited party of an obligation to
compensate the other for the loss he suffers because of the mistake
which they mutually made. But it is clearly in accord with justice
that the benefited party, if he desires to obtain those benefits received under the contract which are not affected by the mistake,
may do so by consenting to the elimination of the effects of the
mistake from the 'terms of the contract, or by compensating the
other party for the loss which the mistake has caused to the expectation interest of the other.
When the courts recognize the expectation interest as entitled
to protection, they give such protection by either an action at law
48

American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Contracts, (1932)
Sec. 502.
49See, for examples Lawrence v. Staigg, (1866) 8 R. I. 256, Brown v.
Lamphear, (1862) 35 Vt. 252.
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for damages, or by a suit in equity for specific performance. So
long as law and equity .were separately administered systems of
remedies, it was dear that the law would often protect the expectaton interest, and would be permitted by the court of equity to do
so, even though the latter court regarded the mistake as one
which would prevent the protection of that interest in equity. In
other words, the courts of equity frequently have refused to grant
to one party to a contract specific performance of the contract,
even though the remedy at law for the breach is inadequate, because of a mistake by the defendant in entering into the contract,
and at the same time they have refused to grant the other party's
.request for cancellation of the contract, the effect of which is to
permit the recovery of damages against hn in an action at law.50
In many of the cases where this result has obtained in the past
it has been due to differences of opinions of the respective courts
as to the weight to be given to the various factors which have
entered into the making of the contract, and to that extent we may
agree with the contention that where the two forms of remedies
are now admiistered by the same courts, in the same form of
action, the distinction should be abandoned and rescission allowed
in any case where specific performance would be denied because of
the mistake. 51 But insofar as the refusal of specific performance is
based on the fact that that remedy will impose on the defendant a
greater hardship than would be caused by compelling him to
pay the damages suffered by the other party because of his
breach, the greater strictness in the allowance of the former
remedy performs a valuable social function. For example, a railroad company, believing that the best location for its line is across
the land of A, enters into a contract with A for the purchase of a
right of way, necessarily paying therefor more than the value
of the strip taken for ordinary uses. The company then discovers
that its engineer was mistaken in believing that a river along that
line could be economically bridged at that point, and it is, there-5oChute v. Quincy, (1892) 156 Mass. 189, 30 N. E. 550; Baker v.
Polydiska, (1919) 144 M inn. 72, 174 N. W 526; Twining v. Neil, (1884)
38 N. J. Eq. 470.
51
Patterson, Equitable Relief for Unilateral Mfistake, (1928) 28 Colunm.
L. Rev. 859, 900. In St. Nicholas Church v. Kropp, (1916) 135 'Minn. 115.
160 N. W 500, L. R. A. 1917D 741, where plaintiff's complaint was based
on the certified check deposited by defendant with his bid, the court held
that the answer setting up the unilateral mistake "rested on the proposition
that a court of equity may, in certain cases where a court of law is powerless, grant relief" and that a jury trial was, therefore, properly denied,
recognizing that even in rescission cases the rules of law and equity are
different.
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fore, obliged to relocate the line. Clearly this is a unilateral, impalpable mistake and it is unlikely that many courts would find in
the facts any basis for refusing to give effect to A's expectation
interest to the extent of awarding him as damages the amount
by which the contract price exceeded the value of the land. But
if the court goes further and decrees specific performance of the
contract, the railroad company will be compelled to pay the full
price for the land and will find itself the owner of a narrow strip
of land running across the land of A, of which it can make no
use, and for which there will be no market, and it will probably
be compelled to sell the strip back to A for whatever price the
latter is willing to give, thus permitting A to reap a benefit from
the company's mistake in addition to the full value of his expectation interest under the contract.12 In all such cases where the hardship is in the performance of the contract, the courts in code states
should, and probably will, retain the distinction between the consequences of a mistake in a suit for specific performance, and those
in an action for damages.
Whenever the case is one in which the expectation interest of
the parties cannot be protected by the law, each one of them will
assert a restitution interest by claiming the right to recover whatever he has delivered to the other party under the contract, and the
law gives full effect to this restitution interest, even to the extent
of forbidding rescission of the contract if the party entitled to
rescind will not, or cannot, restore what has been delivered to him
under the contract.5 3 But in many cases the party against whom
rescission is sought asserts a claim to recover not only what lie has
delivered under the contract but also other losses suffered because
of acts performed in reliance on the contract. So far, this
reliance interest has received very little protection in our law
Fuller and Perdue have demonstrated that a greater recognition
of this interest would simplify many of the problems in determin-

54
ing the proper award of damages for breach of a contract. Such

a recognition would likewise give to our system of remedies for
mistake a greater flexibility that is much to be desired. Almost the
S2Specific performance was refused to the vendor in such a case even
though the railroad's change of line was apparently due to its free choice,
uninfluenced by mistake, in Detroit & I. R. Co. v. Murry, (1925) 21 Ohio
App. 97, 152 N. E. 771.
53American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Contracts, (1932)
Sec. 480, stating the requirement of restitution as a condition to rescission
for fraud, which is made applicable to rescission for mistake by Sec. 510.
5aFuller and Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, (1936,
1937) 46 Yale L. Journ. 52, 373.
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only protection that is generally given by our law to this interest
m cases of mistake in entering into a contract is to forbid rescission if the delay in seeking it has resulted in a change of situation
by the other party which will be prejudicial to him if the rescission
is now allowed. 55 If our courts had the power to award against
the party rescinding the contract a judgment for all losses sustained
by the other party in reliance on the contract, they could more
freely permit rescission for negligent, unilateral mistakes. Such
a result has been reached m a jurisdiction where the statute permitted recovery of the loss suffered by reliance on a contract, and
where the facts showed clear negligence on the part of the party
who made the mistake.56 Under the general practice, the only protection to the reliance interest in those jurisdictions where urnlateral mistake may be the basis for rescission lies in the rule that
the right to rescind exists only while the contract is executory,
and vhile the other party has made no detrimental change of position in reliance on it.
Where the mutual mistake of the parties is caused by the conduct of the party who has benefited by the mistake, the right to
rescission is especially clear, but how about the cases where it is
caused by the conduct of the injured partyl Such cases would seldom arise because it is not customary for parties to negotiations
for a contract to call attention of the adverse parties to factors
which will strengthen the bargaining position of the latter, but
such a case as that previously supposed of the mistake as to the
architect who designed the house might arise.57 It, in such a case
it were clear that the mistake was as to a fact assumed as the basis
for the contract it is probable that the court would say that the
reliance interest of the vendor could not be protected any more
than could his expectation interest since the misconduct of the
purchaser has not been such as to justify imposing on him the
loss which one or the other must suffer because of the diminished
value of the house. But if, as in that case, it is doubtful whether
55
American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Contracts, (1932)
Secs. 483, 510.
56Goodnch v. Lathrop, (1892) 94 dal. 56, 29 Pac. 329, 28 Am. St. Rep.
91, where purchaser selected and inspected a lot which she desired to purchase, and which she mistakenly thought belonged to vendor, then went to
vendor and made an offer to purchase the lot wich he did own in the
vicinity. He accepted the offer and the contract was signed, but the purchaser was allowed to rescind on discovering the mistake, the court stating
that if the vendor has lost anything in reliance on the contract because of
the decrease'in price values, he could recover it under the California Code.
That seems to be a better solution in such a case, than the requirement that
the purchaser
complete the purchase of a lot which she did not desire.
5
iAnte, p. 468.
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the mistake was sufficiently material, so that the court could not
say with assurance that rescission was being sought because of
the mistake and not because the bargain had, for other reasons,
become an unprofitable one, might not the court, as a condition to
allowing the rescission, require that the reliance interest be protected by the payment of the loss the other sustained by reason
of his reliance on the contract? If the courts were to be empowered
to protect this reliance interest, either by a judgment for the recovery of losses suffered in reliance on the voidable contract, or by
making the payment of such losses a condition to the rescission
of the contract, it is probable that the skill of counsel and the
experience of the courts would develop many other situations in
which the device might be used to solve problems in the balancing
of the interests of the parties in mistake cases which now present
extreme difficulties.
This study has considered only a very small portion of the
numerous cases that have been decided in the field of rescission
and reformation for mistake. Perhaps they do not represent a fair
sample of all of the cases, but most of them may properly be considered leading cases 58 because of the frequency with which they
have been cited by other courts and by writers, and may, therefore, be recognized as marking the general trends of the decisions.
A consideration of them indicates, if it does not demonstrate, that,
on the whole, the cases which have caused the confusion in this
field reached results which were more just than would have been
achieved by the application of the recognized rule to the facts involved. Unless we are prepared to hold that the interest of
certainty in the law is great enough to justify frequent injustice to
the individual litigant, it would seem to follow that we ought to
abandon the pretense that this field is governed by any of these
rules and instead frankly admit that the decision in each case will
be made largely by balancing the interests of the respective parties
in the particular case, including as an interest of great, but not
paramount, weight the interest all parties have in assurance that
the contracts into which they enter will be given effect.
5SMost of the cases appear in one or more of the leading case books
on the subject.

